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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-OFFICERS AND AGENTS-WHETHER OR NOT STOCK OF A
BANK DIRECTOR DEPOSrED PURSUANT TO STATUTE FOR PURPOSE OF QUALICA-
TION AS A DIRECTOR MAY BE GARNISHEED THEREBY PRODUCING A FORCED RESIG-
NATION-In the recent case of Molner v. South Chicago Savings Bank,' the
plaintiff was a judgment creditor of a director of the defendant bank.
Pursuant to the banking laws of Illinois,2 under which the defendant bank
was organized, the director had deposited with the bank cashier certain
unendorsed and unassigned certificates of stock owned by the director
in his own right and free of encumbrance. The plaintiff, as judgment
creditor, sought to reach such stock by garnishment proceedings. The
bank answered that, inasmuch as the stock certificates were deposited
pursuant to statute, such property could not be taken on garnishment.
It was argued by the defendant that this result followed because, accord-
ing to the statute, a director "who ceases to be the owner of capital stock
of such bank . . . or becomes in any form disqualified, shall vacate his
1 138 F. (2d) 201 (1943). Major, C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16%, § 4.
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place as such director. ' 3 The defendant's contention was upheld in the
trial court, but on appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and held that the stock certificates were subject to gar-
nishment.
It was not necessary, at common law, that a director be a stock-
holder, 4 as a director was considered to be merely an agent of the cor-
poration which, through its shareholders, was free to choose whom it
saw fit to serve in such capacity. That doctrine, however, has been sub-
ject to modification and, if the general law or the by-laws of the par-
ticular corporation require it, the director would be ineligible to act if
not a shareholder. 5 It has been held though, at least under general
corporation statutes making stock ownership a necessary qualification,
that the holding of bare legal title to the stock is sufficient. 6 In the case
of banks, however, it would seem that an even better title should be
required, 7 and in this state the statute specifically provides that the
qualifying shares must be owned by the director "in his own right."
s
Bearing upon the problem of the instant case is the question of
whether or not a director may resign at will and withdraw his stock
certificate deposited pursuant to law. Such point is important since it
is a well-settled principle of law that one endeavoring to use garnishment
proceedings can acquire no rights superior to those of his judgment
debtor.9 If, therefore, the director could not recover the stock certificates
until his term of office ended, his judgment creditor should have no
greater rights to the same. That question has not, as yet, been decided
by the state courts of Illinois.
Under a provision of the National Banking Act fixing the term of
office of a bank director at one year or until his successor in office has
been elected,' 0 it has been held that a director may resign at his election
prior to the end of his term of directorship." Such cases, of course, are
not decisive of questions arising under state banking laws, particularly
since the National Banking Act merely provides that a director be a
stockholder and does not require the deposit of his qualifying shares with
the bank cashier or other officer. 12 In fact, it has been held under a state
8 Ibid.
4 Fey v. Peoria Watch Co., 32 Ill. App. 618 (1889). See also Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of the Law of Private Corporations, Perm. Ed., Vol. II, § 299.
5 People v. Ittner, 165 Ill. App. 360 (1911); Fletcher, op. cit., II, § 299.
6 People v. Lihme, 193 Ill. App. 341 (1915).
7 National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 214 N.Y.S. 643 (1926).
8 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 4.
9 Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Schueck, 167 Ill. 522, 47 N.E. 855, 59 Am. St. Rep.
309 (1897); Schmitz v. 75th and Exchange Drug Co., 303 Ill. App. 192, 24 N.E.
(2d) 889 (1940).
10 12 U. S. C. A. § 71.
11 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 S. Ct. 924, 35 L. Ed. 662 (1891);
International Bank v. Faber, 86 F. 443 (1898); Movius v. Lee, 30 F. 298 (1887).
The leading case of Briggs v. Spaulding, supra, has been severely criticized:
see note in 17 Yale L. J. 33.
12 12 U. S. C. A. § 72.
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law that a director who has sold his stock and tendered his resignation
is still a de facto officer until his resignation has been accepted, especially
if the circumstances prove that he continued to act on behalf of the
bank.'
8
It must be remembered that the position of director with a bank is
one which is founded on reciprocal acts requiring, as it does, the consent
of the director as well as of those selecting him. Consequently it would
seem to follow that an attempted resignation would be a nullity unless
there has been assent thereto by the corporation, as well, perhaps, by
the state officer having supervision over banks. It has, accordingly, been
held that the resignation of a director presented to the president but not
passed on by the board of directors was ineffective. 14 It might then be
argued that disposition of the qualifying shares, whether by voluntary
sale or by garnishment, should not produce a resignation without con-
currence therein by the bank. But in this state, seizure of the director's
shares, whether accompanied by a formal resignation or not, would seem
to have a bearing on his ability to continue to serve as a director since
he would then no longer possess the requisite qualification laid down
in the statute.
More important, though, is the question whether such shares may
be seized at all by a creditor of the director. When considering the pur-
pose of statutes such as is here involved requiring the bank director to
be a stockholder, it was once said that such statutes provided "a method
frequently resorted to for securing the fidelity of directors in the exercise
of their duties."' 15 Such view was amplified in Hess v. Kismet State
Bank,16 where the Kansas Supreme Court said the main purpose of such
laws was "for the protection of depositors and creditors of the bank.'
7
The statute there involved required that the directors, the cashier, and
the managing officers should own stock not in any way pledged or
hypothecated. It may well be concluded, therefore, that the main pur-
pose of the Illinois provision is to provide a degree of protection to those
who do business with the bank. By limiting the right of the director to
resign and by requiring that he deposit shares of stock some slight pro-
tection for such persons is afforded and the language used would indicate
that more than mere ownership of stock was intended.
The holding in the instant case, by permitting the individual creditor
of a director to reach such shares, deprives the customers and depositors
of the bank of this protection. While the general purpose of garnishment
statutes is to protect creditors and prevent judgment debtors from escap-
ing from the obligation to pay their just debts, it would appear that the
policy of the banking act should prevail in situations like the present one.
A. C. SCHWARZ, JR.
13 Benedum v. First Citizens' Bank, 72 W.Va. 124, 78 S.E. 656 (1913).
14 Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930).
15 Morse, Banks and Banking (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1928),
6th Ed., Vol. 1, § 138.
16 106 Kan. 701, 189 P. 919 (1920).
17 106 Kan. 701 at 703, 189 P. 919 at 920.
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BANKS AND BANKING-STOCKHOLDERS-RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDER WHO HAS
PAID SUPER-ADDED LALIm T TO OBTAIN REFUND AFTER CREDITORS WHOSE CLAIMS
AROSE DURING PERIOD OF STOCK OWNERSHIP HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL FROM
SUCH FUND OR FROM THE ASSETS OF THE CLOsED BANK-In Holderman v. Moore
State Bank,' a suit to recover the super-added liability of the shareholders
of a closed state bank, a petition was presented by certain shareholders
for a refund of a part of the capital stock assessment made against them
on the ground that by reason of the payment thereof and by reason of
sums realized from the assets of the closed bank more than enough had
been collected to satisfy the claims of the creditors whose rights arose
while the petitioners were shareholders. Such petition was stricken by
the trial court when it appeared that certain other creditors of the closed
bank had not yet been paid in full because it held that, until those. claims
were satisfied, no refund was warranted. In reversing such decision, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that if the facts supported the allega-
tions of the petition a refund was properly due the petitioners for any
overpayment they may have made, the same being treated as involuntary
in nature.
2
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has construed the banking article
of the state constitution on many prior occasions, the instant case pre-
sented for the first time the specific question of the right to a rebate
thereunder.3 That article declares that every stockholder in a banking
corporation "shall be individually responsible and liable to its creditors,
over and above the amount of stock by him or her held, to an amount
equal to his or her respective shares so held, for all its liabilities accruing
while he or she remains such stockholder. ' ' 4 In the light of such language
the right to a refund must, of necessity, depend on the resolution of two
subordinate problems. They are, first: just which creditors are to receive
the benefit of the stockholder's added liability; second, should the gen-
eral assets of the closed bank be available to help reduce that liability?
If the words "its creditors" as used therein mean all creditors, then
the fact that full payment had been made to those who became such dur-
ing the period of stock ownership would not be sufficient to relieve the
shareholder. Until all creditors were paid, a refund would clearly be
improper. If, however, the additional language "accruing while he or
she remains such shareholder" serves to limit the class of creditors, then,
1 383 Ill. 534, 50 N.E. (2d) 741 (1943).
2 To the argument that payment made under a misapprehension of law
could not be recovered, the court answered that as the money was paid to an
officer of the court it would "require its officers to disregard technical rules
and do what honest people ought to do."-383 Ill. 534 at 545, 50 N.E. (2d) 741 at
746. See also Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill. App. 570 (1925), at 580. The burden of proof as
to the alleged overpayment was, however, placed on the petitioning shareholders:
383 Ill. 534 at 547, 50 N.E. (2d) 741 at 746.
3 In People ex rel. Barrett v. Farmers State Bank, 371 Ill. 222, 20 N.E. (2d) 502
(1939), the question concerned the right to a rebate after all the debts of the
closed bank had been fully paid.
4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 11, § 6. The language is repeated in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 16%, J 6.
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upon satisfaction of the claims of that class, further liability should end
and surplus funds should be returned. The significant word is "accruing"
as used in this article. It may have been used as one of limitation to
describe a class, or it may have been intended to serve as a maximum
limit upon the measure of the stockholder's liability. If it possesses the
latter meaning, it serves merely to fix the amount the shareholder may
be called upon to pay, but would not entitle him to designate the way in
which the creditors are to share therein.
At common law, a stockholder had no such liability as is here in-
volved. 5 Consequently, a few Illinois courts, applying the theory that the
obligation was designed to aid the common law, have construed the pro-
vision liberally. The case of Queenan v. Palmer,6 for example, held that
a charter or statute making the shareholders of a corporation individually
responsible in an amount equal to their stock, to make good losses to
depositors and others, would be construed to make the stockholders liable
to all creditors who might suffer from the default or failure of the cor-
poration to pay its debts. 7 In Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Company8
the court held that the constitutional provision had the effect of measur-
ing the liability rather than designating which creditors were entitled
to share in payments made by stockholders for the period in which the
liability accrued and, therefore, the stockholders had no interest in the
distribution of funds which they were compelled to pay in satisfaction
thereof. 9 It was in Heine v. Degen,10 though, that the court spoke most
strongly in favor of this position for it there ruled that since the consti-
tutional liability of the stockholders was a liability to the creditors and
not to the bank, such liability was for the benefit of the creditors generally
and the liability of a particular stockholder, although measured by the
liabilities accruing during his ownership of stock, was not to creditors
of that period alone. Such view has also been adopted in at least two
other states."
But the extreme language used in these decisions was repudiated in
the instant case as being foreign to the accepted purpose of the super-
added liability. Such purpose had originally been declared, in the leading
case of Golden v. Cervenka,12 to impose on a stockholder liability only
to those who were creditors and only for such obligations as were incurred
while he was a stockholder. As a consequence, in Hillmer v. Chicago
Bank of Commerce,13 the court decided that, where the par values of
5 Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409 at 418, 116 N.E. 273 at 278 (1917).
6 117 Ill. 619, 7 N.E. 613 (1886).
7 117 Ill. 619 at 630, 7 N.E. 613 at 618.
8 366 Ill. 98, 7 N.E. (2d) 850 (1937).
9 See also Comstock v. Morgan Park Trust & Savings Bank, 363 Ill. 341, 2 N.E.
(2d) 311 (1936).
.o 362 Ill. 357, 199 N.E. 832 (1936).
"Bundy v. Wilson, 66 Colo. 253, 180 P. 740 (1919); Duke v. Johnson, 123 Wash.
43, 211 P. 710 (1923).
12 278 Ill. 409, 116 N.E. 273 (1917).
13 375 Ill. 266, 31 N.E. (2d) 309 (1941).
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shares were reduced and certain stockholders who held stock before and
after the reduction had settled their constitutional liability at the higher
rate, the excess payments resulted in a discharge of the other share-
holders on stock owned during the same period. Such view was also
followed in Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank of Centralia,14 People v.
Farmers State Bank of Irvington,15 and in Comstock v. Morgan Park
Trust & Savings Bank.16
The better view, therefore, seems to be that only those creditors
whose claims arose during the period of stock ownership are entitled to
the benefit of the added liability and the same should not be regarded as
a general fund available to all creditors.' 7 Any overpayment should, then,
be returned and has been so ordered returned in other states prior to
the instant decision. Cases may be found in Minnesota, i8 New York,
19
Oregon,20 and in Wisconsin 2' directing the return of such overpayments
under provisions similar to that found in Illinois.
The second problem involves the right of the shareholder to require
that the general assets of the closed bank be taken into consideration in
order to help reduce his liability or to determine the extent of the refund
due him. If the shareholder was merely secondarily liable there could
be no doubt of his right to require the creditor to exhaust his remedy
against the principal debtor first, 22 but in this state the liability has
been declared to be a primary one,23 hence the creditor may seek a
decree against the shareholder personally and is not obliged to proceed
against the closed bank.24 It is obvious, though, that the creditor is
entitled to but one satisfaction 25 and whether he receives the same from
the shareholder or from the bank would be a matter of no consequence
to himself.
If a particular creditor is paid from the fund provided by the share-
holders, the claims against the closed bank are accordingly reduced thus
leaving more assets available to discharge the sums due to creditors not
so well favored. The latter, then, on the theory of marshalling assets,
26
might have a right to insist that such be done. The possibility of a re-
fund would then be reduced and the net effect would be to extend the
scope of the shareholder's liability, if not directly at least indirectly, to
benefit those not encompassed within its limits. Particularly is this true
14 349 Ill. 547, 182 N.E. 897 (1932).
15 371 Ill. 222, 20 N.E. (2d) 502 (1939).
16 363 Ill. 341, 2 N.E. (2d) 311 (1936).
17 Luikart v. Higgins, 130 Neb. 395, 264 N.W. 903 (1936).
18 Hanover State Bank by Veigel v. Barry, 170 Minn. 445, 213 N.W. 36 (1927).
19 Broderick v. Adamson, 262 N.Y.S. 582 (1933).
20 Skinner v. Davis, 156 Ore. 174, 67 P. (2d) 176 (1937).
21 Schwenker v. Bekkedal, 204 Wis. 546, 236 N.W. 581 (1931).
22 In re Bank of Winslow, 36 Ariz. 507, 287 P. 444 (1930).
23 Babka Plastering Co. v. City State Bank of Chicago, 264 Ill. App. 142 (1931).
See also Schalucky v. Field, 124 Ill. 617, 26 N.E. 904 (1888).
24 Queenan v. Palmer, 117 Ill. 619, 7 N.E. 613 (1886).
25 Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Co., 366 Ill. 98, 7 N.E. (2d) 850 (1937).
26 Sternberger v. Sussman, 69 N. J. Eq. 199, 60 A. 195 (1905).
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if the court having charge of the liquidation proceedings should dis-
tribute any funds realized from the bank's assets in other than a uniform
fashion to its creditors. As the shareholder has no right to inquire
into the distribution of the fund raised from the super-added liability,
2 7
it would seem he would lack any right to inquire into the manner of dis-
tributing the bank's assets provided they were paid to its creditors.
The existence of such assets should not, therefore, be taken into con-
sideration in determining the super-added liability.
Payments made therefrom may, however, according to the instant
case operate fortuitously to lessen such liability or even to extinguish it.
As between the shareholder and his particular creditor such a result is
manifestly fair as payment from either source is all the latter should
expect. Whether the same is true as to the other creditors, who pre-
sumably did business with the bank in expectation that its general assets
would serve as security for payment, is another question. In the absence
of protest on their part, the result achieved would seem just.
It need scarcely be pointed out that all such problems would be elimi-
nated if the super-added liability provision did not exist. At least thirty-
one states, within the last decade, have abolished double liability, either
absolutely or upon compliance with certain conditions, 28 as has also the
federal government in the case of the national banks.
29 Short of constitu-
tional amendment, such is not possible in Illinois, but a simple note will
serve to illustrate how shareholders feel on the subject.
3 0 The lessons
of the depression, moreover, have tended to discourage investment in
state bank shares by persons financially responsible. The prime intention
of the framers of the constitutional provision in question, then, seems
faced with indirect, if not direct, defeat.
J. E. REEvs
CONSTrrUTiONAL LAw-RicHT TO JUSTICE AND RFEmizs FOR INJum-
WHETHER OR NOT "GUEST" STATUTE, LIMITING LIABILITY OF DRlvER FOR INJURY
To GUEST, APPLEs TO WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AND ALSO WHETHER SUCH
27 Comstock v. Morgan Park Trust & Savings Bank, 363 Ill. 341, 2 N.E. (2d)
311 (1936).
28 See list under heading "Stockholders' Double Liability" in C. C. H. State
Banking Law Service, Vol. II.
29 The liability imposed by 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 63-4 was abrogated, in 1933, by
12 U. S. C. A. § 64a.
30 The Auditor of Public Accounts reported that during the biennium from
June 30, 1936, to June 30, 1938, there was a net decrease of 32 in the number of
state banks in Illinois. Of this group, 22 were voluntarily liquidated, one con-
solidated with a national bank, and 11 were converted into national banking asso-
ciations: Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1937-38 (Springfield, 1938), 524. In an
effort to lessen such liability, the legislature also adopted a special statute of
limitations in 1941: Laws 1941, Vol. 1, 272; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 164h, §§ 6a-6h.
A proposal to revise the state constitution on this point was submitted to the elec-
torate on Nov. 5, 1940. Out of a total vote of 4,262,196 cast, only 1,138,306 ballots
were marked on the subject of the amendment, hence the proposal failed. Of
those voting, however, the ratio of affirmative votes was more than double the
negative, being 775,170 affirmative against 363,136 negative.
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STATUTE VIOLATES FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROwSIoNS RE GARDSN G
DUE PROCESS AND PRESERVATION OF REMED s-The plaintiff, in Clarke v.
Storchak,' as administratrix for her deceased husband's estate, sued to
recover for the wrongful death of decedent while riding in defendant's
automobile. The complaint charged both ordinary negligence and wilful
and wanton conduct. Defendant's answer denied the allegation as to
wilfulness and, for a further defense, pleaded that the decedent was
riding as a guest hence no cause of action could be maintained for ordi-
nary negligence. Plaintiff, by way of reply, asserted that her action
was based on the Injuries Act 2 and that the same was not affected by
the provisions of the so-called "guest" statute,3 or if it was, then the
latter statute was unconstitutional since it violated both the Federal and
the State Constitutions in several particulars. 4 A motion by defendant
to strike such reply was granted and, at the ensuing trial, the issues were
confined to questions of wilful and wanton conduct on defendant's part.
The jury specially found that the deceased was a guest and also found
that defendant was not guilty of wantonness. Upon such finding, judg-
ment in the trial court was rendered in favor of defendant, which judg-
ment on appeal was affirmed. In arriving at such decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court5 concluded that the limitations imposed by the Motor
Vehicles Act 6 were not only constitutional in character but were equally
applicable to suits for wrongful death as well as those brought by sur-
viving victims.
No right of action for wrongful death existed at common law,
7 and
remedy is provided today only by virtue of statute.8 It should be remem-
bered, though, that the right of the representative to sue depends upon
1 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E. (2d) 229 (1944).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 70, § 1.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95 , § 58a.
4 The claim of unconstitutionality rested upon the theory that the statute in
question violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
as an attempt to deprive plaintiff of due process of law. Violation of the State
Constitution was charged on the ground that the statute embraced more than one
subject in its title, contrary to Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13, and also because
it deprived plaintiff of that certain remedy for injuries and wrongs guaranteed
by Art. II, § 2 and § 19 thereof.
5 Direct appeal was permitted as the court found the question of the constitu-
tionality of the statute had been directly raised by the pleadings and passed upon
by the trial court: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 199(1). Jenisek v. Riggs, 381
Ill. 290, 44 N.E. (2d) 902 (1942), was distinguished on the ground that the question
of constitutionality of the identical statute here involved was not raised until
motion for new trial. The Appellate Court, upon transfer, refused to inquire
into the precise points concerned in the instant case: Jenisek v. Riggs, 320 Ill.
App. 158, 50 N.E. (2d) 121 (1943).
6 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95 , § 58a.
7 Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1606); Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.
493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See also Dougherty v. American McKenna Process
Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619, L.R.A. 1915F 955 (1912).
s The first Illinois statute was enacted in 1853: Laws 1853, p. 97. It was amended
in 1903 by increasing the maximum limit of recovery to $10,000 and by reducing
the period within which suit might be brought to one year: Laws 1903, p. 217. In
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the existence of the same facts as would be required to support action
by the deceased victim had he survived and brought suit in his own name.9
Similarly, the legislature would be free at any time to abolish the statute
if it saw fit, or to impose any lawful conditions it might choose at least
as to the future. Since the right to sue is not absolute, it follows that if
the legislature has validly placed limits thereon, the plaintiff is bound
thereby. The provisions of the so-called "guest" statute would clearly
constitute limitations on the right of action had the victim survived, for
they would serve to deny recovery to one riding in an automobile if he
was a non-paying passenger and the driver was not guilty of'wilful or
wanton misconduct.' 0 If such provisions are valid, they would, in the
same way, limit the possibility of recovery by the legal representative
in the wrongful death cases."
The principal criticism of the pertinent statute involved in the instant
case was founded on that provision of the Illinois Constitution which
declares that: "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person ... .
It was argued that the "guest" statute deprived plaintiff of that "certain
remedy" which had heretofore been enjoyed in wrongful death cases,
to-wit: to recover whenever the death was caused by defendant's fault
whether produced by mere carelessness or by his wilful conduct. Such
argument was met by the assertion that no vested right was thereby
conferred but that the guarantee was subject to the over-riding power
of the state to make reasonably necessary changes when required to
effectuate the police powers enjoyed by the sovereign government.'
3
It is on this theory that "guest" statutes have been upheld in other
jurisdictions, 1 4 particularly where the driver has not been freed from all
1935 the statute was again amended to deny the right of action for death occurring
outside the state if a cause of action existed at the place of death and service
could be obtained there: Laws 1935, p. 916.
9 Bishop v. Chicago Rys. Co., 303 Ill. 273, 135 N.E. 439 (1922); Biddy v. Blue
Bird Air Service, 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E. (2d) 14 (1940).
10 Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 III. 168, 46 N.E. (2d) 980 (1943), affirming 314 Ill.
App. 551, 41 N.E. (2d) 777 (1942).
11 One argument against validity of the statute in question was that the pro-
visions thereof were not germane to the general title, hence violated Ill. Const.
1870, Art. IV, § 13. The court decided the provisions were referable to one general
scheme or purpose so were valid under the authority of Campe v. Cermak, 330 Ill.
463, 161 N.E. 761 (1928), and People ex rel Kell v. Kramer, 328 Ill. 512, 160 N.E. 60
(1928).
12 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
18 People v. John Doe of Rosehill Cemetery Co., 334 Ill. 555, 166 N.E. 112 (1929);
City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 II. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); State Public Utilities Com-
mission v. City of Quincy, 290 Ill. 360, 125 N.E. 374 (1919).
14 Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943 (1928), affirmed in
280 U. S. 117, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221, 65 A.L.R. 939 (1929); Naudzius v. Lahr,
253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E.
(2d) 643 (1935); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P. (2d) 1009 (1935); Shea v.
Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P. (2d) 615 (1936). Although the decisions are few in
number, the series of statutes is quite extensive. See a list thereof in the opinion
in Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P. (2d) 1009.
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liability. 15 In only one state has a "guest" statute been declared invalid
as violating constitutional rights, but the holding there depended upon
a specific provision in the state constitution authorizing suit for wrongful
death whether arising from negligence or from other forms of conduct.'
6
In the absence of such a specific limitation on the point, and there is none
such in Illinois, the legislature should be free to exercise the police power
of the state if it determines there is need for a reasonable application
thereof. In the case of the "guest" statutes, it has also been held that
the division between non-paying and paying passengers does not amount
to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 17 Even if the remedy for
injury were a common-law one, such may be constitutionally circum-
scribed by statute provided the remedy is not eliminated in all circum-
stances' s and the restriction is not discriminatory within the class of
persons affected. 19 Certainly, the victim has no vested right prior to the
infliction of injury, hence he cannot well complain if legislation, effective
before the injury occurs, restricts his recovery in the interest of the
sovereign police power.
20
The Illinois statute in question, when tested by such principles, is
obviously constitutional as it does not grant absolute immunity for the
wrongdoer, treats all non-paying passengers in the same equal fashion,
is not retroactive in operation, and bears evidence of a considered exer-
cise of the police power. The flow of collusive claims which arose from
automobile accidents whenever the driver carried liability insurance
was sufficiently marked to cause the United States Supreme Court to say:
"We are not unaware of the increasing frequency of litigation in which
passengers carried gratuitously in automobiles, often casual guests or
licensees, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries alleged
to have been due to negligent operation. In some jurisdictions it has
15 An early Oregon statute was held invalid, because the operator was freed
from all liability, in Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 P. 998, 61 A.L.R. 1236
(1928), petition for rehearing denied in 127 Ore. 597, 272 P. 893 (1928). A subsequent
statute of that state was approved when it preserved liability in case of wilful
or reckless fault: Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P. (2d) 1009 (1935). See also
Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. 120, 159 A. 649 (1932).
16 Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W. (2d) 347 (1932). A Delaware statute
was held unconstitutional on the ground that a complete denial of liability went
too far, though the court acknowledged that some limitation on liability would
be regarded as valid: Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. 120, 159 A. 649 (1932).
17 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221, 65 A.L.R. 939
(1929), affirming 108 Conn. 371, 43 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943 (1928).
18 Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P. (2d) 615 (1936).
19 Smith v. Williams, 51 Ohio App. 464, 1 N.E. (2d) 643 (1935); Naudzius v.
Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931).
20 Perozzi v. Ganierc, 249 Ore. 330, 40 P. (2d) 1009 (1935). See also note on
Fearon v. Treanor, 288 N.Y.S. 368 (1936), in 15 CHICAGo-KENT REviEw 138,
and note on Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E. (2d) 619 (1937), in 16
CHICAGO-KENT REvIEw 182. A comparable Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 38, §§ 246.1-246.6, was declared unconstitutional in People v. Mahumed, 381
Ill. 81, 44 N.E. (2d) 911 (1942), but on the narrow ground that the purpose of the
act was not clearly disclosed by the title. The point here concerned was not
discussed.
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been judicially determined that a lower standard of care should be exact-
ed where the carriage in any type of vehicle is gratuitous. . .Whether
there has been a serious increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in
this class of cases, where the carriage is by automobile, is for legislative
determination, and, if found, may well be the basis of legislative action
further restricting the liability. ' 21 That court also observed that "In
this day of almost universal highway transportation by motor car, we
cannot say that abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits growing
out of the gratuitous carriage of passengers in automobiles do not pre-
sent so conspicuous an example of what the legislature may regard as
an evil, as to justify legislation aimed at it, even though some abuses
may not be hit."
22
Whether "guest" statutes, where constitutional, will continue to serve
the purpose for which they were intended is a matter not so free from
doubt. Since the existence of wantonness, or other basis for liability in
guest cases, is a matter of fact rather than one of law, a lenient jury
could well stretch the language used in any specific statute purporting
to limit liability so as to permit recovery. 23 If popular feeling is adverse
to the legislative conception of a reasonable exercise of the police power,
such statutes might well be undermined if not actually nullified unless
the courts are alert to prevent the same by exercising control over the
jury through the power to set aside verdicts which do not conform thereto.
W. W. VALENI-NE
DEEDS-CONsTrUCTION AND OPERATION-WHETHER PROVSION IN PRELIM-
INARY SALE CONTRACT FOR AN EASEMENT IS "MERGED" BY THE SUBSEQUENT
EXEcUTION OF A DEED WHICH CONTAINS NO SUCH EASEMENT PROvisION-In the
case of Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Wabash-Randolph Corpora-
tion,1 plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction to compel defendant, an
adjoining landowner, to remove an obstruction from his portion of a
private alley over which the plaintiff claimed a right of easement for
ingress and egress. Both parties traced their title back to a common
grantor, one Walker. It appeared that in 1863 Walker contracted to sell
the north portion of the premises to one Farwell. The preliminary con-
tract between them contained a reservation of a right of passage over
the premises about to be sold in favor of the south portion. Pursuant to
such contract, suitable reservation was included in the deed of convey-
ance. Subsequently, Walker agreed to sell the south portion to McKey
and in that contract it was stipulated that the purchaser should leave a
passageway open over the premises, conforming to that established on
the Farwell tract, for the common benefit of all persons owning any
portion of the entire premises. The deed which consummated that
transaction, however, contained no provision for an easement. The south
21 Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 at 122, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221 at 225.
22 Ibid., 280 U.S. 117 at 123, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221 at 226.
23 See, for example, Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So. (2d) 565 (1942).
1 384 Ill. 78, 51 N.E. (2d) 132 (1943).
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portion was later resubdivided and a part thereof, together with the
north portion acquired by Farwell, was ultimately vested in plaintiff
while the balance of the south portion was acquired by the defendants.
The passageway was apparently laid out and used for many years, but
about 1923 a portion of the extreme south end thereof was enclosed by
erecting a small store building thereon. Plaintiff served notice of its
claim under the easement and then sued to vindicate the same, relying
solely on the language of the Walker-McKey sale contract. Defendant
contended that since the only mention of the intention to create an ease-
ment was contained in that contract, such intention was destroyed or
merged in the subsequent deed which failed to expressly reserve the
right.2 The trial court found in defendant's favor and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the ground that since
the agreement by McKey to create the easement could not have been
fulfilled by the mere delivery of the deed, there had been no merger.8
It is a well settled principle that, in the absence of fraud or mistake,
4
all prior negotiations and agreements leading up to the execution of a
deed are said to be merged therein and such agreements thereupon
become functus officio. 5 If, however, the prior agreement is collateral
to the deed there is no merger.6 A covenant is said to be collateral to
the deed when it deals with a subject matter other than the conveyance
of land, or when it provides for additional acts to be performed by the
vendor or vendee other than the conveyance. For example, covenants
by the vendor to erect a building,7 to put the vendee in possession of a
building situated on the premises,8 to convey a building on the premises,9
to continue the maintenance of a dam, 10 and the like," have all been
2 The court noted that in approximately thirty instruments affecting the chain
of title since 1866, no reference to the purported easement appeared in eighteen
of them but some reference was made in twelve others, one as late as 1932: see
384 Ill. 78 at 83, 51 N.E. (2d) 132 at 135.
3 The claim was also advanced that if an easement had ever existed it had been
lost by abandonment through agreement. The court found that, if any such agree-
ment of abandonment was made, it -did not bind plaintiff since it was made by
the plaintiff's lessee without authority.
4 In Trapp v. Gordon, 366 Ill. 102, 7 N.E. (2d) 869 (1937), the court held that the
contract to create an easement was not merged in the deed because the evi-
dence showed that the easement provision had been omitted by mistake. In the
instant case, the evidence failed to disclose any such mistake.
5 Weber v. Aluminum Ore Co., 304 Ill. 273, 136 N.E. 685 (1922); Ridley v. Moyer,
230 Ala. 517, 161 So. 526 (1935). See also cases cited in 26 C. J. S., Deeds, § 91c;
27 R.C.L. 532, § 264. 6 Ibid.
7 Doty v. Sandusky Portland Cement Co., 46 Ind. App. 440, 91 N.E. 569 (1910).
8 Biewer v. Mueller, 254 Ill. 315, 98 N.E. 548 (1912).
9 Laflin v. Howe, 112 Ill. 253 (1885).
10 Shelby v. C. & E. I. R. R. Co., 143 Ill. 385, 32 N.E. 438 (1892). Although the
court there seemed to base its decision on the fact that the easement there
concerned was appurtenant to the land and would pass without any mention of it
in the conveyance, the court did say: "If it was not in the nature of an easement
appurtenant to the land, it was a collateral right secured by the contract, and
not being covered by the deed, was not affected by it." See 143 InI. 385 at 398,
32 N.E. 438 at 443. It should be noted, however, that an agreement to maintain
an existing dam is different from an agreement to create an easement.
11 Tighe v. Locke, 299 S.W. 105 (Mo. App., 1926); West Paterson Sand & Gravel
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treated as collateral agreements because they were convenants which
"do not have to do with the title, possession, quality, or emblements of
the land conveyed.'
2
It would seem, from such principles, that the Illinois Supreme Court,
when deciding against a merger in the instant case, must have treated
the easement provision in the Walker-McKey sale contract as providing
for a collateral agreement. But the authorities cited by the court on
that point do not sustain that position,'8 and a number of courts in other
jurisdictions have held that an easement contract such as is here in-
volved is not collateral, hence does merge in the subsequent deed.
14
It may be helpful, in order to evaluate the instant case, to consider
the nature of an easement and its effect on the servient estate. An
easement has been defined as a right or privilege, but without right of
profit, which the owner of one piece of land may have in the land of
another. 15 It is a property right and, as such, it gives the owner of the
dominant tenement a restrictive use or right in the land of the servient
one. For this reason, it is an encumbrance on the estate of the servient
Co. v. Great Notch Corp., 107 N.J. Law 309, 153 A. 592 (1931); Janitscheck v.
Melbro Realty Corp., 107 N.J. Law 450, 154 A 749 (1931); Ireland v. Penn Motors
Corp., 100 N.J. Eq. 166, 134 A. 835 (1926); Brownback v. Spangler, 101 N.J. Eq. 388,
139 A. 524 (1927); White v. Crandall, 105 Fla. 70, 143 So. 871 (1932); Talmadge v.
West Orleans Beach Corp., 18 La. App. 417, 137 So. 368 (1931); Christiansen v.
Intermountain Ass'n of Credit Men, 46 Ida. 394, 267 P. 1074 (1928); Bowditch v.
E. T. Slattery Co., 263 Mass. 496, 161 N.E. 878 (1928); Mueller v. Bankers' Trust
Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933). See also 18 C. J., Deeds, § 231.
12 Doty v. Sandusky Portland Cement Co., 46 Ind. App. 440 at 443, 91 N.E. 569
at 571 (1910).
13 The court cited the cases referred to in notes 4, 8, and 9, ante. In the Trapp
case the provision for an easement had been omitted by a clear mistake. In the
Biewer case the agreement referred to the subsequent delivery of possession
after deed was delivered. In the Shelby case the contract called for the continued
maintenance of a dam. It is submitted that in such cases the mere delivery of a
deed did not, and could not, fulfill all the contractual obligations. In the instant
case, the easement could, and was probably intended to, come into existence, if
at all, contemporaneously with the grant. The court, however, states: "The
agreement of the McKeys to establish an easement could not become effective
until after delivery of the deed, therefore, by its delivery the easement provision
was not merged in the deed." See 384 Ill. 78 at 87, 51 N.E. (2d) 132 at 137 (italics
added). Such language is inconsistent with an earlier statement by the court that
no easement could arise at the time of making the contract since the McKeys
then had not title to encumber, but that ". . . when the purchase price was paid
and the deed delivered, the title passed and the agreement . . . to create an
easement ... became effective and operated to create the burden of an easement
upon each of the McKey lots." See 384 Ill. 78 at 87, 51 N.E. (2d) 132 at 136.
14 Downs v. National Bank of Bakersfield, 101 Cal. App. 712, 282 P. 420 (1929);
City of Aransas Pass v. Minter, 34 S.W. (2d) 1113 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931); Stone v.
Tigner, 165 S.W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942); Carr v. Augusta Grocery Co.,
183 Ga. 346, 188 S. E. 531 (1936); Simmons v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Wash.
384, 153 P. 321 (1915); Clifton v. Jackson Iron Co., 74 Mich. 183, 41 N.W. 891 (1889).
15 Wessels v. Colebank, 174 Ill. 618, 51 N.E. 639 (1898). See also 28 C. J. S.,
Easements, § 1.
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tenement, 16 hence it does affect the title and possession thereof. As
such, it is properly a part of the subject matter of the conveyance.
It is difficult to see, then, how it can be termed a collateral agreement.
The decision in the instant case also leads to the novel conclusion
that an easement appurtenant can be created by a mere contract. Once
the parties have entered into a contract calling for such an easement,
even though they might later change their minds, they apparently cannot
prevent the creation of this restriction by merely omitting such provision
from the final deed which purports to give the grantee an unencumbered
title. The intention of the parties, as clearly manifested in the recorded
conveyance, is apt to be defeated by the production of an obscure sales
contract which should have been regarded as extinguished by perform-
ance through the deed. If mistake or fraud were present, such result
might be regarded as just, but in the absence thereof the final deed should
be the only evidence of the title granted. Restrictions on the use of land
are frowned upon by the courts unless adequate provision in an instru-
ment clearly and finally expresses the intention of the parties to create
such a restriction.17 For that reason, such restrictions are generally
created by the formality of either a dedication or an express provision
in the deed itself.' 8 To hold, as does the instant case, that such restrictions
can be created by an informal executory contract which is not conclu-
sive as to what the parties eventually intended but indicates only what
the parties at one time agreed to convey, would not only be contrary to
the general principles outlined above but would be apt to lead to much
confusion. 19
MARY JANE SACCONE
EXTRADITION-INTERSTATE ExTRADITIoN-WHETHER OR NOT ASYLUM STATE
WAIVES JURISDICTION OVER PRISONER SERVING SENTENCE BY RECOGNIZING ExTRA-
DITION REQUEST OF DEMANDING STATE AND MAY COMPEL RETURN OF PRISONER
FOR PURPOSE OF SERVING BALANCE OF SENTENc--In the recent case of People
ex rel. Barrett v. Bartley,' an original petition in mandamus was pre-
sented to the Illinois Supreme Court to compel the defendant, judge of a
state circuit court, to expunge an order which he had entered liberating
a prisoner from the state penitentiary upon a writ of habeas corpus.
It appeared that the prisoner, after plea of guilty, had been sentenced to
serve a term of years in the Illinois penitentiary. Prior to the expiration
of his term, and without application from the prisoner, the parole board
16 Kneip v. Schroeder, 255 Ill. 621, 99 N.E. 617 (1912); Mackey v. Harmon, 34
Minn. 168, 24 N.W. 702 (1885); Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 132 S.W.
(2d) 553 (Tex. Sup., 1939). See also 28 C. J. S., Easements, § lb.
17 Voorhees v. Blum, 274 Ill. 319, 113 N.E. 593 (1916).
I8 Loomis v. Collins, 272 Ill. 221, 111 N.E. 999 (1916). See also 18 C. J., Deeds,
§ 449.
19 The right to the easement, in the instant case, could possibly have been
established by prescription, but that question was not apparently presented to the
court.
1 383 IMI. 437, 50 N.E. (2d) 517 (1943).
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granted a conditional parole. Before the same had become effective, the
governor honored an extradition requisition by the State of Wisconsin.
Upon surrender of the prisoner to that state, he was tried, convicted,
sentenced, and served a term in its state prison. At the time of his
release therefrom, no request for his surrender being pending, he was
allowed to go to Ohio where, for a subsequent offense, he was confined
in the penitentiary of that state. While so detained, the Illinois parole
authorities requested surrender of the prisoner for an alleged violation
of parole. After the prisoner's return to Illinois pursuant to such request,
he sought and secured his discharge on habeas corpus. It was this order
which the relator in the instant case sought to have expunged. Such
request was, however, denied when the Supreme Court concluded that
the conduct of the governor in releasing the prisoner to the state of
Wisconsin amounted to a pardon of the unexpired portion of the prisoner's
sentence.
Had the conditional parole in the instant case been applied for by
the prisoner, or had he been released pursuant to its terms, there could
probably be no doubt of the right of the state to compel the prisoner's
detention for the balance of the original sentence as a parole violator.2
The court, however, found that the parole had never become effective
and all that was accomplished was a transfer of the prisoner from one
place of detention to another. Such finding raised the question of the
legal effect of the act of the governor in surrendering the prisoner to
another state without reservation. That question does not appear to have
received extensive consideration, nor has it been given a unanimous
answer.
In the absence of an outright pardon, decisions exist holding that the
release of a prisoner undergoing sentence on an extradition warrant
amounts only to a temporary release from custody and that, as a con-
sequence, jurisdiction may be resumed when the purpose of extradition
has been satisfied. In Johnson v. Lowry,3 for example, a Georgia court
took the attitude that the penitentiary was not a place of sanctuary,
hence release of the prisoner to stand trial elsewhere did not result in
loss of jurisdiction over him. An enlightening opinion by the justices of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also indicates that a release
of a prisoner does not amount to a waiver of the right to demand ful-
fillment of punishment unless a formal pardon accompanies the release.4
There is also language in the Texas case of Ex parte Hobbs5 which would
tend to support such view for the court there said: "This jurisdiction,
being operative, takes precedence of the one claimed until its purpose
2 At the time of his surrender to the Wisconsin authorities, the prisoner signed
a statement in which he pledged himself to "comply honestly" with all the
conditions of the parole. If such document were effective, his subsequent conduct
in Ohio was a clear breach of such pledge: People v. Decker, 382 Ill. 404, 47 N.E.
(2d) 475 (1943).
3 183 Ga. 207, 188 S.E. 23 (1936).
4 In re Opinion of the Justices, 201 Mass. 609, 89 N.E. 174 (1909).
5 32 Tex. Cr. 312, 22 S.W. 1035, 40 Am. S. R. 782 (1893).
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shall have been completed. The Governor of this State has no power, by
the issuance of warrant [of extradition] to arrest its action."
6 In Pennsyl-
vania, the issue was expressly covered by a statute which permitted the
governor to grant extradition of an inmate of the penitentiary but placed
a limitation thereon requiring agreement by the demanding state for the
return of such prisoner to serve the balance of his term.
7 It was, there-
fore, held that the return and re-incarceration of the extradited prisoner
did not constitute a violation of his rights.
8
On the other hand, although the precise question has never, prior to
the instant case, been raised in Illinois, 9 it has been decided in the same
way in at least four other states' 0 and at least one case specifically holds
that the surrender was tantamount to a pardon." Such cases appear to
be more in harmony with the concept of extradition since the executive
is not bound to grant the request 12 and, if he sees fit to do so, he does
not need the concurrence of the judicial department to the implied waiver
of jurisdiction.13 If the executive is willing to waive control on behalf of
the state, it would seem unfair for the state to assert, at a later time, that
jurisdiction could be resumed. In that regard, attention might be drawn
to the decision in the case of Ex parte Guy 14 where the Oklahoma court
held that conditions imposed by the governor upon the release of a
prisoner were void.
The Illinois court, in the instant case, while adopting the holding of
that case expressly stated that it did not mean to approve all that was
said therein with regard to the power of the executive to attach condi-
tions to the surrender of a prisoner. 15 The way would seem open, then,
6 32 Tex. Cr. 312 at 318, 22 S.W. 1035 at 1037, 40 Am. S. R. 782 at 785.
7 Pa. Laws 1933, p. 249; 19 Pa. Pub. Stat. § 121, reads: ". . . Provided, however,
That prior to the removal of the person from this State, the executive authority
of the demanding state or district shall have agreed that the person so delivered
up is to be returned immediately . . . in the event of his or her acquittal in the
demanding state .. " It should be noted that this statute is not broad enough
to cover return after service of sentence in the demanding state, and it was
repealed in 1941.
s Commonwealth ex rel. Kamons v. Ashe, Warden, 114 Pa. Super. 119, 173 A.
715 (1934).
9 Nearest to it is People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 149 N.E. 799, 42 A.L.R. 581
(1925), where the defendant, awaiting trial in Wisconsin was surrendered to the
Illinois authorities. His plea that he was constitutionally entitled to a speedy trial
in Wisconsin and such right was invaded by extradition was overruled, the court
holding that while Wisconsin was not obliged to grant extradition, its act in so
doing was a waiver of the right to detain.
10 Jones v. Morrow, 154 Kan. 588, 121 P. (2d) 219 (1942); People v. Hagan, 34.
Misc. 85, 69 N.Y.S. 475 (1901); Hart v. Mangum, 146 Ga. 497, 91 S.E. 543 (1917);
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 S. Ct. 291, 29 L. Ed. 544 (1885).
11 Hess v. Grimes, 5 Kan. App 763, 48 P. 596 (1897).
12 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2. See also Ex parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S.
(24 How.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717 (1861).
13 State v. Saunders, 288 Mo. 640, 232 S.W. 973 (1921); Ex parte Middaugh, 40
Okla. Cr. 280, 268 P. 321 (1928).
14 41 Okla. Cr. 1, 269 P. 782 (1928).
15 383 Ill. 437 at 446, 50 N.E. (2d) 517 at 521.
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should such be the desired purpose, to release upon a conditional parole
or a conditional warrant for extradition. Recapture would then be pos-
sible, although to remove all doubt legislation similar to that in Pennsyl-
vania might be advisable.
E. 0. DAW
TRUSTS-CoNSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-WHETHER OR NOT SURVIVING
SPOUSE IS AN "HEm" WITHIN MEANING OF LANGUAGE IN TRUST INSTRUMENT
PROVIDING THAT UPON DEATH OF BENEFICIARY THE TRUST RES SHOULD BE CON-
VEYED TO HEIRS AT LAW OF BENEFICAY-In Bundy v. Solon' the facts dis-
closed that two brothers who were business partners conveyed their
business property to a trustee, at the same time entering into a trust
agreement 2 wherein it was provided that the survivor should be per-
mitted to continue to conduct the business but that, at the death of the
survivor, the trustee was to transfer all the property held under the deed
of trust by conveying one-half thereof to the "heirs-at-law" of each
brother unless otherwise disposed of by will. Following the death of the
surviving partner, the trustee filed a complaint for a construction of the
terms of the trust agreement, but more particularly to determine the
persons to whom the property should be conveyed. The widow of one of
the brothers filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she asserted
she was an "heir-at-law" within the meaning and intention of the trust
agreement. Children of this same brother by a prior marriage moved to
strike the counterclaim on the ground that the widow was not an heir-at-
law within the meaning of that term as used in the trust agreement, that
term being, according to them, limited to mean children. The lower
court sustained such motion and dismissed the counterclaim. On appeal
by the widow, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed such decree and re-
manded the cause with directions to enter a decree giving to the widow
a share as an "heir-at-law" of her deceased husband.
In its opinion, the court stated that "whether one is an heir-at-law
is determined by statute, and generally an heir is designated as one who
succeeds by descent to lands, tenements and hereditaments, or is a person
appointed by law to succeed to an estate in case of intestacy. ' 3  The
court pointed out that in 1923 the Statute of Descent 4 had been amended
so as to allow the surviving spouse, in lieu of dower, to inherit an absolute
estate consisting of a one-third part of each parcel of real and personal
estate left by the deceased who died with issue surviving provided dower
therein was waived in writing or by failing to elect to waive the same
within one year. By reason thereof, the court concluded, the widow had
the right to be considered as an heir "because such status must be
1 384 Ill. 137, 51 N.E. (2d) 183 (1943).
2 A detailed statement of the language of the trust instrument is set forth in
the opinion.
3 384 Ill. 137 at 142, 51 N.E. (2d) 183 at 186.
4 Laws 1923, p. 325; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1923, Ch. 39, § 1.
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changed by her own act,"
5 lacking which the property was cast upon her
by law.
Under the common law, courts had little difficulty in giving inter-
pretation to the word "heir" since neither husband or wife could possibly
fit that term, which included only the blood relations of the deceased
ancestor. 6 But statutes have been passed from time.to time abrogating
the common-law meaning thereof by giving the surviving spouse a share
of some kind in the deceased spouse's estate. For three score years,
therefore, in Illinois numerous cases have held that the word "heir" or
similar terms, when uncontrolled by the context and in the absence of
special terminology in the instrument requiring a different construction,
serve to designate that class of persons appointed by law to succeed to
the estate as in case of intestacy.
7
The Illinois Descent Statutes, as they existed prior to 1923, provided
that where the deceased spouse left no issue then the surviving spouse
was to receive a one-half interest in fee in the deceased person's lands
plus all of the personalty. If issue survived, however, the survivor re-
ceived only one-third of the personalty and none of the real estate.8
Consequently, at that period, if an instrument provided for a remainder
to the heirs of a beneficiary, the word would be interpreted to include
the surviving spouse in case the beneficiary died without issue,
9 but
would not be so interpreted if issue survived.
10 In 1923, however, the
Descent Act was amended so as to give the surviving spouse an interest
in land owned by one who left issue provided the right to dower was
waived. 1 In Countiss v. Whiting,'2 a case arising under that statute,
the trust instrument had provided that in the event of the death of certain
beneficiaries their share was to be paid to their "lawful heirs." Upon the
death of one such beneficiary, her husband claimed a share in her portion
of the trust proceeds, but the court there held that while the word "heir"
designated the person appointed by law to succeed to the realty as in case
5 384 IIl. 137 at 144, 51 N.E. (2d) 183 at 187.
6 See Zacharias, Husband and Wife as "Heir" Under Testate Succession, 12
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 264 (1934).
7 When used in wills, see Rawson v. Rawson, 52 Ill. 62 (1869); Richards v.
Miller, 62 Ill. 417 (1872); Kelley v. Vigas, 112 InI. 242, (1884); Potter v. Potter, 306
Ill. 37, 137 N.E. 425 (1922); Tilton v. Tilton, 382 Ill. 426, 47 N.E. (2d) 454 (1943);
Richardson v. Roney, 382 Ill. 528, 47 N.E. (2d) 714 (1943). When used in trust in-
struments, see Emery v. Emery, 325 Ill. 212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927). When used in
insurance policies, see Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 126 Ill.
558, 18 N.E. 556 (1888).
8 Hurd, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1921, Vol. I, Ch. 39, § 1, para. 3 and 4.
9 Rawson v. Rawson, 52 In. 62 (1869); Richards v. Miller, 62 Il. 417 (1872);
Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 126 Ill. 558, 18 N.E. 556 (1888);
Clemens v. Munroe, 212 II. App. 296 (1918).
10 Gauch v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 251 (1878). But see Walker
v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11, 118 N.E. 1014 (1918), where the spouse was included despite
the fact that issue survived as the will made specific reference to the Descent Act.
11 Laws 1923, p. 325; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1923, Ch. 39, § 1.
12 306 II. App. 548, 29 N.E.. (2d) 277 (1940), noted in 20 CHIcAGo-KENT LAw
REViEw 28, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 981.
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of intestacy, still, as the husband had not renounced his dower right, he
was not to be included in such class.
In 1939, however, the statute was again amended,'
3 but this time the
surviving spouse was treated as an heir enjoying a conditional estate
which would become vested if the demand for dower, in lieu thereof, was
not asserted within one year so that mere failure to act was deemed a
waiver and operated as an election to take an absolute interest in fee as
an heir. A note on the Countiss case therefore suggested that should the
situation therein arise again after the adoption of the later amendment
the result would probably be different since, by that act, the surviving
spouse "inherits a share in the realty absolutely unless he perfects his
right to dower."' 14 The instant case carries out such suggestion and may
be said to make the Countiss case no longer applicable law.
Attention should be called, however, to two other trust cases decided
by the Illinois Appellate Court in recent years. In each of these cases the
deceased spouse died testate and, as a consequence, it was held that the
surviving spouse could not share since, even if he or she did answer to
the description of a "legal heir" under the Descent Act, such statute was
not in point.15 In the case under discussion, the deceased spouse died
intestate so such decisions stand unchallenged by anything decided
therein. The doctrine of those cases has not, however, escaped criticism
on the ground that the simple term "heir" should not have one meaning
for purpose of intestate succession and another where a will is involved. 16
The decision in the instant case clearly refuses to make such a dis-
tinction where a trust agreement is concerned and tends to indicate that
the same view would be followed if a will were involved. If the donor's,
or testator's, desire is to exclude the surviving spouse it would seem
advisable that such desire should be clearly and specifically expressed
by the use of words that are commonly employed for that purpose.
Reliance on the simple term "heir" to accomplish that result would seem
unsafe.
W. S. GROTEFE
UsuRY-UsuRIous CONTRACTS AND TRANSACTIONS-WHIETHER PRoVIsIoN IN
NOTE CALLING FOR INCREASE IN RATE OF INTEREST AFTER MATURITY IS A STIPULA-
TI N AS TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR INVOLVES THE ELEMENT OF UsuRY-Accord-
ing to the facts in the case of Randall v. Home Loan & Investment Com-
pany,' the defendant loaned $800 to the plaintiff's assignor, taking a note
Is Laws 1939, p. 10; I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 162, effective Jan. 1, 1940. See
also Illinois Probate Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1940), pp. 14
and 31.
14 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 29.
15 Hall v. Ray, 275 II. App. 344 (1934); Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Bladel,
281 Ill. App. 437 (1935).
16 See 12 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEw 264 at 288, and 14 CHICAGO-KET RE-
vIEw 194. Logic would deny the theory that the deceased spouse must die intes-
tate before the surviving spouse could be considered an heir. See also Tilton v.
Tilton, 382 Ill. 426, 47 N.E. (2d) 454 (1943).
1 - Wis.-, 12 N.W. (2d) 915 (1944).
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calling for monthly payments together with interest calculated at the rate
of 9.8%. Such note further provided that if the monthly payments were
not paid promptly on or before the first of each month an additional
penalty of one per cent. should be added thereto. Part of the principal was
paid by the deceased debtor during his lifetime. The balance was paid by
the plaintiff as the assignor of the debtor's estate. But, by reason of delin-
quencies, penalties were also collected pursuant to the terms of the note.
The plaintiff, contending that these additional penalties should be con-
sidered as additional interest, brought action to recover treble the
amount of the interest so paid as a violation of a local statute 2 fixing a
maximum rate of ten per cent. 3 Judgment for the plaintiff in the trial
court was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which
held that the one per cent. penalty provision, in the absence of any proof
to the contrary, was inserted for the purpose of securing prompt payment
at maturity and was not to be considered as an additional interest
charge.
As authority for such decision, the Wisconsin court relied on the
early Illinois case of Funk v. Buck 4 in which a creditor was permitted
to collect interest after maturity at a rate in excess of the lawful one.
Reliance upon such case as authority seems at first sight to be astonish-
ing for it no longer represents the law of this state. It is true that Illinois
cases decided under earlier Illinois usury statutes followed the general
rule hereinafter mentioned. 5 In 1879, however, the Illinois legislature, ob-
serving the abuse to which penalty provisions could be put and realizing
that the use thereof in many cases was but a subterfuge to evade the
usury law, passed a statute which declared that notes providing for "in-
terest or compensation at a greater rate than herein specified, on account
of non-payment at maturity, shall be deemed usurious."6 Pursuant there-
to, Illinois courts since then have declared provisions calling for the
unlawful increase of interest after maturity to be a violation thereof. 7
Similar statutes have been adopted in other states, 8 or the same result
has been achieved by judicial construction of existing statutes.9 No such
statute exists in Wisconsin, however, nor had the immediate question
been passed upon by the courts thereof prior to the decision in the
instant case.
2 Wis. Stat. 1943, § 115.07.
3 Ibid., § 115.04.
4 91 Ill. 575 (1879).
5 Gould v. Bishop Hill Colony, 35 Ill. 324 (1864); Lawrence v. Cowles, 13 Iln. 577
(1852); Davis v. Rider, 53 Ill. 416 (1870); Wilday v. Morrison, 66 Ill. 532 (1873).
6 Laws 1879, p. 184, § 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 74, § 6.
7 Barton v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 122 Ill. 352, 13 N.E. 503 (1887); Metzenbaugh
v. Troup, 36 Ill. App. 261 (1890); McNail v. Welch, 26 Ill. App. 482 (1888); Leonard
v. Patton, 106 mll. 99 (1883).
8 See In re Leeds & Co., 49 La. Ann. 501, 21 So. 617 (1897), for an application of
La. Rev. Code, Art. 2924; Chase v. Whitten, 51 Minn. 485, 53 N.W. 767 (1892), as
to what is now Minn. Stat. 1941, § 334.01; Globe Invest. Co. v. Barta, 107 Conn.
276, 140 A. 202 (1928), for application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 1918, § 4797.
9 Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W. (2d) 282,
rehearing denied, 39 S.W. (2d) 11, 84 A.L.R. 1269 (1931); Ulvilden v. Sorken, 58
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
In the absence of statutory regulation, the general rule seems to be
that a stipulation in a note calling for a greater rate of interest than is
allowed by law prior to maturity in the event of non-payment at maturity
is not enough to render the transaction usurious if the parties, when in-
serting such provision, act in good faith and without intent to use the
same as a device to evade the usury law.'
0 The theory behind such rule
seems to be that the increase in rate after maturity is not considered
by the parties as an interest charge but is either a provision for liquida-
dated damages or else is a conditional penalty which the debtor may
avoid by prompt payment of the note. While enforcement of such provi-
sion may be open to question because of its being a penalty, the courts
generally have refused to consider it as an exaction of usury. Accordingly,
creditors have been allowed to collect as much as thirty per cent.
11 and
even fifty per cent. 12 after maturity. In such cases, the burden of proving
the transaction to be usurious is on the debtor and there is a presumption,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, that such a stipulation is only a
penalty inserted for the purpose of securing prompt performance.1
3
The fundamental purpose of usury statutes, however, is to afford the
debtor with protection against unreasonable demands by the avaricious
lender of money, which demands tend to stifle commerce and trade.
14
To carry out the full purpose of such statutes, then, it would seem reason-
able that the protection thereof should be extended to cover the rate of
interest chargeable after,, as well as before, maturity. For all practical
purposes, the essence of the transaction remains the same if the loan is
not repaid at maturity. The relation of debtor and creditor still exists
between the parties, and the charge after maturity continues to be com-
pensation for the use and forbearance of money just as it was prior
S.D. 446, 237 N.W. 565 (1931); Miller v. Life Ins. Co., 118 N.C. 612, 24 S.E. 484
(1896). The statutes involved in these cases defined interest as the compensation
for the "use, forbearance or detention of money." The word "detention" was
held to cover the rate of interest chargeable after maturity. See also a similar
construction, even though the word "detention" was lacking, in J. I. Case Thresh-
ing Machine Co. v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App. 512, 161 S.W. 286 (1913); Bang v. Phelps
& Bigelow Windmill Co., 96 Tenn. 361, 34 S.W. 516 (1896).
10 State Mut. Rodded Fire Ins. Co. v. Randall, 232 Mich. 210, 205 N.W. 165, '41
A.L.R. 973 (1925); Diehl v. Becker, 227 N.Y. 318, 125 N.E. 533 (1919); Easton v.
Butterfield Live Stock Co., 48 Ida. 153, 279 P. 716 (1929); Funk v. Buck, 91 Ill.
575 (1879); Weyrich v. Hobelman, 14 Neb. 432, 16 N.W. 436 (1883); Law Guaran-
tee & T. Soc. v. Hogue, 37 Ore. 544, 62 P. 380 (1900); Ward v. Cornett, 91 Va.
676, 22 S.E. 494 (1895); Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley, 87 Wash. 438, 151 P. 792 (1915);
Elliott v. Sugg, 115 N.C. 236, 20 S.E. 450 (1894).
11 Downey v. Beach, 78 Ill. 53 (1875).
12 Wright v. Shuck, 1 Greene (Iowa) 128 (1848).
13 In Sanner v. Smith, 89 Ill. 123 (1878), the presumption was overcome by
evidence that the excessive rate of interest charged after maturity was paid in
advance. In Osborn v. McCowen, 25 Ill. 218 (1861), a note payable one day after
date with 25% interest after maturity was treated as usurious because it was
clear from the start that it would be impossible for the debtor to pay the note
on time and hence was a device to evade the usury law.
14 See Tyler, A Treatise on the Law of Usury, Pawns or Pledges, and Maritime
Loans (Albany, 1873), Ch. IV.
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thereto. Toleration of the practice of charging additional sums under
the guise of liquidated damage provisions merely aids the creditor evade
the usury law.
It might be argued that the debtor can still protect himself against
such practices by seeking equitable relief on the ground that the exces-
sive charge after maturity constitutes an unenforcible penalty. Whether
the stipulation is a penalty one or is, in fact, an enforcible provision for
liquidated damages is a question of law for the court to decide, depending
on the construction placed upon the contract. 15 That construction, in turn,
depends largely on the nature of the transaction involved and the
reasonableness of the amount agreed upon by the parties. If the contract
is of such nature that the court could easily compute the amount of
damage caused by breach and the sum agreed upon is thereby shown to
be excessive, the court will regard the provision as one calling for a pen-
alty regardless of any designation given it by the parties and will enforce
only that part thereof which it considers reasonable. 16 On this basis, a
provision for an increased rate of interest after maturity within lawful
limits has generally been considered to be a stipulation for liquidated
damages rather than for a penalty. 7 But equitable relief has not always
been given against a provision calling for an unlawful increase of interest
after maturity, 8 for the provision has been treated as a measure for
liquidated damages "accruing from day to day, of which the party can,
at any time, relieve himself by payment, and therefore involving, ordi-
narily, no special hardship calling for interference" by the equity court. 19
Such decisions tend to leave the debtor completely at the mercy of the
creditor, or provide an uncertain protection at best.
The wisdom of enacting statutes which either expressly or impliedly
forbid any excessive charge of interest after maturity is evident. They
will not only carry out fully the fundamental purpose of the usury laws
but will also serve to prevent the money lender from collecting indirectly,
in the guise of liquidated damages, that which he is forbidden, by positive
law, to collect directly.
MARY JANE SACcONE
15 Weiss v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 300 Ill. 11, 132 N.E. 749 (1921).
16 Advance Amusement Co. v. Franke, 268 Ill. 579, 109 N.E. 471 (1915).
17 Jewell Realty Co. v. Kansas City L. Ins. Co., 182 Ark. 397, 31 S.W. (2d) 521,
75 A.L.R. 394 (1930); Funk v. Buck, 91 Ill. 575 (1879); Federal Land Bank of
Omaha v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339, 252 N.W. 507, 94 A.L.R. 1338 (1934); Sheldon v.
Pruessner, 52 Kan. 579, 35 P. 201, 22 L.R.A. 709 (1894); Glidden v. Chamberlain,
167 Mass. 486, 46 N.E. 103 (1897); Union Estates Co. v. Adlon Constr. Co., 221
N.Y. 183, 116 N.E. 984, 12 A.L.R. 363 (1917); National Life Ins. Co. v. Hale, 54
Okla. 600, 154 P. 536 (1916); Close v. Riddle, 40 Ore. 592, 67 P. 932 (1902); Finger
v. McCaughey, 114 Cal. 64, 45 P. 1004 (1896); McKay's Estate v. Belknap Say.
Bank, 27 Colo. 50, 59 P. 745 (1899).
18 Downey v. Beach, 78 Ill. 53 (1875).
19 Bane v. Gridley, 67 Ill. 388 at 390 (1873).
